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WRONGFUL GEOPHYSICAL EXPLORATION
Robert J. Rice*
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following three situations:
(1) An oil company offers to lease a landowner's' property for five
dollars per acre. After being turned down by the landowner, who
is holding out for ten dollars, the company breaks down the fence
while the owner is away, trespasses upon the property and con-
ducts seismic tests. The information obtained reveals that the
landowner's property lacks any indication of favorable minerali-
zation. The oil company tells the owner it is no longer interested
in leasing at any price.
(2) Failing to acquire a lease upon its terms, the oil company in-
structs its seismic crew to travel along the county road bordering
the land in question and "shoot" across the landowner's property.
They do, with the same results as in situation number one.
(3) After being turned down by the landowner, the oil company
conducts geophysical exploration entirely upon adjacent property
which it holds under valid lease. Based upon those tests, the oil
company extrapolates the results and concludes that the land-
owner's property has no lease value and therefore withdraws its
offer.
Has the landowner suffered a legally compensable loss in any
of the foregoing situations? If so, what right or rights have been
violated and what should be the measure of damages?
The courts have implicitly recognized a new tort: wrongful ap-
propriation of the right to explore. The right to explore belongs to
the mineral owner or his lessee. Although implying the existence of
the tort, courts have been reluctant to explicitly recognize it and
have attempted to wrap recovery in traditional legal theories, such
as trespass or conversion, which do not logically or historically fit
the new tort. Reliance upon such traditional theories has caused
confusion and inconsistency among the cases.
As interest by oil companies in Montana and other Rocky
Mountain states has increased, so has mineral exploration in-
creased. This exploration, combined with new technology, has
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1. Unless otherwise stated, the term "landowner" will be used in this article to refer to
the owner of both surface and minerals. Where the minerals have been severed, the terms
"mineral owner" or "surface owner" will be used where appropriate.
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magnified the likelihood of conflict between mineral exploration
and the interests of the landowner. To develop a consistent legal
framework within which to resolve this conflict, Montana must ex-
plicitly recognize the tort of wrongful appropriation of the right to
explore.
The focus of this article is on the development of the new tort,
the traditional legal theories applied in the case law and their
shortcomings, and the types of damages the courts have awarded
parties injured by wrongful geophysical exploration.
II. GEOPHYSICAL EXPLORATION
Geophysics deals with the composition and physical phenom-
ena of the earth and its environment.2 Geophysical prospecting de-
pends upon a few fundamental variables in the earth's physical
condition, including gravity, magnetism, electrical resistance, and
seismic vibrations.3 Sensitive instruments are used to measure
changes in these variables which may be related to certain subsur-
face conditions. These conditions, in turn, point to probable oil or
gas-bearing formations.4
The technology of geophysical exploration is advancing rap-
idly, due in large part to renewed interest and support by oil com-
panies. Deeper and more costly drilling and generally higher ex-
ploration costs, associated with more difficult targets, have
required the acquisition of ever larger amounts of geophysical data.
This has led to an emphasis on perfecting more reliable and faster
data acquisition techniques.5
The first geophysical instruments used for oil and gas explora-
tion were the surface magnetometer, the refraction seismograph,
and the torsion balance for gravimetric surveying.' Early cases al-
leging wrongful geophysical exploration contain many references to
the use of these instruments. Later came the reflection seismo-
graph, gravimeter, and airborne magnetometer. Perhaps the most
commonly used geophysical exploration instrument today, replac-
ing the shot hole method' as the favorite technique, is the com-
2. UNIV. oF TEXAS, FUNDAMENTALS OF PETROLEUM 27 (2d ed. 1981).
3. Id. at 27.
4. Id.
5. See generally Rice, Exploration Geophysics 1975-1980, 8 GEoPHysics 1088 (1981).
6. Id. at 28. A magnetometer measures magnetic intensities while a seismograph
records the velocity and character of the earth's vibrations created by a shock. The torsion
balance is an instrument which measures the direction and strength of the force of gravity.
7. E.g., Le Bleu v. Vacuum Oil Co., 15 La. App. 689, 132 So. 233 (1931); Thomas v.
Texas Co., 12 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
8. The shot hole method is still fairly commonly used. With this technique small di-
[Vol. 44
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pressional wave vibrator.9 This instrument is mounted under a
truck. When placed on the ground, the vibrator generates continu-
ous low frequency sound waves which penetrate downward into the
rock layers. Each formation reflects the sound waves back to the
surface, where they are picked up and changed into electrical im-
pulses by instruments called geophones. 10 A significant develop-
ment in surface exploration is the use of the helicopter in acquiring
commercial quality gravity data. Helicopters have been used ex-
tensively in the Rocky Mountain Overthrust Belt where access is
often difficult because of severe topography."
Land based exploration methods have become so advanced
that it is sometimes unnecessary to be physically present on the
surface of property that is being geophysically explored. By em-
ploying an instrument called the Seisloop, for example, receivers
can be placed along roads surrounding an inaccessible area of in-
terest." As seismic sources are activated around this perimeter,
traces are generated that cover the area inside the loop. Thus, a set
of data can be put together to provide seismic coverage over an
otherwise inaccessible area. 3 Such an area may be inaccessible to
an oil or geophysical exploration company for a variety of reasons,
including lack of permission by the landowners. When methods
such as these are employed to conduct unauthorized exploration of
the subsurface below the inaccessible area, questions arise regard-
ing possible violation of the landowner's rights.
III. THE RIGHT OF EXPLORATION AS A PROPERTY RIGHT
Conflict between mineral exploration and landowners arose
early in the development of the oil industry. Most often the con-
flict occurred in the form of unauthorized seismic tests accompa-
nied by physical trespass upon the surface of the land.
That a legal right of the landowner is violated by such unau-
thorized geophysical exploration was readily determined by the
courts. In the noted Louisiana case, Angelloz v. Humble Oil &
aneter holes are drilled in the surface at several locations called "shot points." A shot point
may consist of several shot holes. Into these holes are placed explosive charges which are
detonated, creating shock waves that are reflected by subsurface formations to seisometers
placed at strategic locations on the surface. The seisometers are connected to a truck that
records the impulses.
9. Nelson, A Geophysical Outlook-Part 3, WORLD OIL, Dec. 1981, at 180 [hereinafter
cited as Nelson].
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1092.
12. Nelson, supra note 8 at 116.
13. Id.
1983]
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Refining Co.," the defendant oil company entered plaintiff's prop-
erty after permission had been refused and placed four torsion bal-
ance stations in a line across one corner. The total area involved
was about fifty-five acres, out of nine hundred fifty acres owned by
plaintiff. The survey yielded unfavorable information regarding the
presence of oil under the property, and the information was then
communicated to other oil companies. Plaintiff sued Humble in
trespass, seeking to recover the value of the right to enter and con-
duct a geophysical survey, and also asking damages for loss of lease
value caused by defendant's actions. The Supreme Court of Louisi-
ana upheld an award of $7500 to the plaintiff by the trial court,
which had found that defendant had received information of value
to it from the survey, and that the survey had caused a deprecia-
tion of the leasing value of the land. The court emphasized that
"[t]he right to permit entry upon land to conduct geological
surveys or for the purpose of exploring for oil, gas or other miner-
als is a valuable property right and belongs exclusively to the
owner."
15
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden," the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals applied the same reasoning: "There can be no doubt
that in Texas the right to explore for oil and minerals is a valuable
property right that can be legally protected.' ' 7
Where the mineral estate has been severed from the surface
estate, the right to explore has been determined to be an attribute
of the mineral ownership.18 The extent of this right to explore,
when it conflicts with the rights of the surface owner, is still being
defined.'
The mineral owner can, of course, convey the right to explore
either by itself or in conjunction with a mineral lease. When doing
so, it is important that the parameters of the right be made clear
in the grant, because the consequences to both parties can be se-
vere if the operator exceeds its authority. In a Montana case, Fran-
cis v. Sun Oil Co.,' 0 plaintiff landowner did not object to defendant
conducting explosive seismic tests on his property. He did object,
14. 196 La. 604, 199 So. 656 (1940).
15. Id. at 608, 199 So. at 658.
16. 241 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1957).
17. Id. at 590. See also Ohio Oil Co. v. Sharp, 135 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1943); Layne La.
Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 209 La. 1014, 26 So.2d 20 (1946).
18. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1957); Wilson v. Texas
Co., 237 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
19. See Western Energy Co. v. Genie Land Co., - Mont. -, 635 P.2d 1297
(1981)(right to conduct resource inventories on the surface held to be part of right to
explore).
20. 135 Mont. 307, 340 P.2d 824 (1959).
[Vol. 44
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however, when he observed that defendant was getting too close to
a spring and told defendant to "be sure, damn sure no damage was
done to this spring."' 1 Over plaintiff's objections, defendant oil
company proceeded to detonate a charge which destroyed the
spring. The Montana Supreme Court held that when defendant's
geophysical activities exceeded the terms of the consent given, it
became a trespasser ab initio and was liable for all damages di-
rectly caused by its trespass, irrespective of negligence.a
A non-exclusive right to explore will be implied in a mineral
lease where the exploration right is not specifically mentioned and
has not been previously conveyed.13 In most modern oil and gas
lease forms the right to explore is expressly made exclusive in the
lessee. Where the mineral owner has conveyed an exclusive right to
explore, the holder of the exploration right, not the mineral owner,
will have the right to bring an action for unauthorized geophysical
exploration.' 4
IV. LEGAL THEORIES OF RECOVERY
Although the courts have been willing to cloak the right to ex-
plore for minerals in a mantle of legal protection, they have been
less successful in finding an appropriate legal theory under which
to provide that protection. This has led to confusing and some-
times contradictory decisions.
A. Trespass
Most early factual situations which presented the issue of un-
authorized geophysical exploration were associated with a physical
trespass to the land. Thus, perhaps naturally, the first attempts to
recover damages were based primarily on the tort of trespass.
In one of the earliest cases, Thomas v. Texas Co.,'G defendant,
while conducting a gravitational survey on adjacent land, entered
onto plaintiff's property and placed two torsion balance stations on
a portion of plaintiff's land. The negative results of the survey
were then made known to other oil companies. Following disclo-
sure of the information, companies which previously had been ne-
gotiating with plaintiff to purchase a royalty interest withdrew
their offers. Plaintiff sued in trespass, claiming destruction of the
21. Id. at 310, 340 P.2d at 825.
22. Id.
23. Ready v. Texaco, 410 P.2d 983 (Wyo. 1966); see Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 1419 (1969);
Yates v. Gulf Oil, 182 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1950).
24. Wilson v. Texas Co., 237 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
25. 12 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
19831
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value of his royalty interest. The appellate court upheld the trial
court's directed verdict for defendant on the grounds that there
was insufficient evidence linking the trespass with the alleged
damages.2"
In general, however, when the unauthorized geophysical activi-
ties were accompanied by a physical trespass, courts usually have
found that a legal right was violated.27 Perhaps because of the
early link between trespass and wrongful exploration, physical
trespass is almost essential to recovery in many jurisdictions. Reli-
ance upon trespass as a theory of recovery, however, has led to
inconsistent results in cases where no physical trespass accompa-
nies the unauthorized exploration.
In Kennedy v. General Geophysical Co.,28 defendant, denied
permission to conduct seismic tests on plaintiff's land, conducted
them on adjacent property by exploding dynamite charges in shot
holes placed ten to fifteen feet from plaintiff's boundary. Plaintiff,
suing in trespass, claimed that vibrations from the shot points
travelled through his property. The court, however, concluded that
no trespass had been committed. Citing Corpus Juris and a line of
blasting cases, the court refused to base liability upon the theory
that the vibrations amounted to a trespass. "To constitute tres-
pass," the court indicated, "there must be an entry upon the
land."2 9
In a similar factual situation, however, the Tenth Circuit
Court implied that vibrations were indeed sufficient in themselves
to constitute a trespass.30 In Ohio Oil Co. v. Sharp, plaintiff oil
company hired a geophysical company to shoot seismic tests along
a county road, without the consent of adjacent mineral owners.
The tests were run, and an employee of the geophysical company
disclosed the results to Sharp, who obtained leases on the adjacent
property. Plaintiff oil company sued to impose a contructive trust
on the leases. Although the decision was based on other grounds,
the court conceded for the sake of argument that the geophysical
tests constituted a trespass upon the rights of the mineral owner."1
A concurring judge denied that such tests could be a trespass, be-
26. Id. at 598.
27. Francis v. Sun Oil Co., 135 Mont. 307, 340 P.2d 824 (1959); Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1957); Angelloz v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 196 La. 604, 199
So. 656 (1940).
28. 213 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
29. Id. at 712. An important factor in the court's refusal to find a trespass appears to
be the fact that no information directly concerning plaintiff's property was found.
30. Ohio Oil Co. v. Sharp, 135 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1943).
31. Id. at 306.
(Vol. 44
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cause trespass requires an invasion of possession. In Oklahoma the
landowner does not own the oil and gas in place, Judge Phillips
reasoned, but merely owns an incorporeal hereditament. "It is dif-
ficult for me to see how there can be a trespass upon a incorporeal
hereditament."3
2
Reliance upon trespass as a theory of recovery for unautho-
rized geophysical exploration presents inherent logical difficulties
and, as these cases demonstrate, can lead to contradictory results
in ownership and non-ownership states.33 Most courts, drawing
from blasting case analogies, appear to hold that mere seismic
waves or explosive vibrations, without accompanying physical en-
try, are insufficient to constitute a trespass.3 " Their unwillingness
to stretch the definition of trespass seems to be based on sound
policy considerations, as the ramifications of such a holding would
be far-reaching. A mineral owner, for example, may be unable to
develop his own property for fear that waves or vibrations from
exploration or drilling activities would "escape" onto his neighbor's
land. Further, the increasingly widespread use of microwave tech-
nology to disseminate telephone, radio, and television signals
would create insurmountable problems for detecting geophysical
"trespassers."
Nonetheless, associating unauthorized geophysical testing with
a physical entry and calling the combination a trespass against the
mineral owner is a logical non sequitur. The physical entry, usually
in the form of breaking a gate or fence, walking or driving onto the
land and damaging vegetation or structures, occurs on the surface
of the property and is a trespass against the surface estate, not the
mineral estate. Thus, the only "trespass" committed against the
mineral estate continues to be vibrations from seismic testing,
which, as we have seen, does not constitute a trespass. It is appar-
ent that the wrongful exploration committed against the mineral
owner is something other than a trespass. Unfortunately, the con-
fusion has been perpetuated by courts and some commentators
who continue to refer to unauthorized geophysical operations as
"geophysical trespass."35
32. Id. at 310 (Phillips, J., concurring).
33. See generally R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 1.3 (1971).
34. Kennedy v. General Geophysical Co., 213 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 13, at 66 (4th ed. 1971); see Herrin v. Sutherland, 74 Mont. 587,
241 P. 328 (1925)(where the court implied that trespass requires invasion of property by a
tangible object); see Annot., 42 A.L.R. 937 (1926).
35. See Brown, Geophysical Trespass, 3 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 57 (1957); 4 W.
SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 660 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Summers].
1983]
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B. Conversion
Some courts and attorneys have recognized that in many situ-
ations trespass is not a viable theory on which to base recovery for
unauthorized geophysical operations, and they have attempted to
press into service other common law actions. One of these actions
is conversion-traditionally applied to personal property and de-
fined as "unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of
ownership over [property] belonging to another, to the alteration
of [its] condition or the exclusion of the owner's rights."3 6
In Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Moores" plaintiff brought an ac-
tion against Shell in Texas for alleged unauthorized exploration
which occurred on plaintiff's property in Louisiana. After negotia-
tions for permission to conduct seismograph tests on plaintiff's
property were unsuccessful, Shell allegedly entered plaintiff's land
and conducted the tests anyway. Judgment for plaintiff in district
court was reversed by the Fifth Circuit on the grounds that the
action was one for trespass and that a trespass committed in Loui-
siana was not maintainable in Texas.38 Anticipating this objection,
plaintiff had argued that defendant's actions amounted to a con-
version of plaintiff's property right by making unauthorized tests
and acquisition of information concerning the presence of oil. The
court, however, resisted the effort to break away from the trespass
theory:
The trespass which the court's opinion shows it found was com-
mitted did not have the effect of a taking or converting by the
appellant of a property right of the appellee. The appellee's right
to the exclusive possession and use of his land was the same after
the trespass as it was before. No part of the fee simple owner's
property right in land is taken or converted by a trespass which
violates that right. The right of action for wrongfully entering
upon and using appellee's land was one in trespass, not one for
converting a thing which was susceptible of being taken and car-
ried away. The contention under consideration is not
sustainable.3
Based on the common law limits of the action for conversion, the
court was correct in refusing to apply it to unauthorized geophysi-
cal operations. Historically, the action has been limited strictly to
tangible personal property and intangible property customarily
36. BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY 300 (5th ed. 1979).
37. 46 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1931).
38. Id. at 962.
39. Id. at 961-62.
[Vol. 44
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identified with a tangible document.40
Montana law appears to conform to the common law limits of
conversion. In Thompson v. Mobil Producing Co.,41 the federal
district court held that confidential oil information is not property
subject to conversion. Thompson, an independent geologist, sub-
mitted to Mobil a confidential oil and gas prospect with the inten-
tion of having Mobil join in the drilling of a well. Mobil rejected
the plaintiff's prospect but after the expiration of plaintiff's option
on the land, acquired its own leases on the same land and pro-
ceeded to drill a well. In his complaint plaintiff alleged that Mobil
had converted the information to its own use. In holding that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action, the Montana Federal
District Court cited the common law rule that personal property
can be the subject of conversion only if it is of a tangible nature, or
if it is tangible evidence of title to intangible or real property.42
"Confidential oil information," the court concluded, "is not prop-
erty which is the subject of an action in conversion. 43
C. Quasi-Contract
Other plaintiffs have attempted to recover for unauthorized
geophysical operations on the basis of assumpsit or quasi-contract,
analogizing that the defendant wrongfully took from the plaintiff a
right (to explore for minerals) for which he should pay the market
value.
Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Scully 44 involved such a theory.
Plaintiff alleged that defendant oil company physically entered his
property without consent and conducted seismic tests. It was not
claimed that the information gleaned from the tests decreased the
value of the property; the test results were actually favorable, and
the land was worth more for leasing purposes after the tests than
before. Plaintiff, however, claimed and recovered the value of the
right to go on the property and explore. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the recovery (but reversed the amount of damages)
upon plaintiff's "simple theory that by an act at least quasi an of-
fense, giving rise to an obligation in quasi-contract, defendant had
taken a privilege for which he ought to pay, though in the exercise
of it he had not caused plaintiff any injury. . . .,45
40. W. PRossm, LAw op ToRTS § 15, at 82 (4th ed. 1971).
41. 163 F. Supp. 402 (D. Mont. 1958).
42. Id. at 404.
43. Id.
44. 71 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1934).
45. Id. at 775.
19831
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Texas, however, appears to be in the minority in allowing re-
covery for unauthorized geophysical operations on the basis of
quasi-contract or assumpsit.4" The problem with basing recovery
on this remedy is much the same as with conversion. The remedy
has accumulated such an historical crust of procedural barnacles
that it cannot be stretched to fit the wrong committed by unautho-
rized geophysical activity. For example, a majority of courts still
require a "tenancy" as a prerequisite to maintaining the quasi-con-
tract action for wrongful use or occupation of land.47 The tenancy
requirement is deeply rooted in the historical assumpsit action for
use and occupancy of land and which would lie only where there
was a tenancy.'
8
D. Disparagement of Quality or Title
Although pleadings and discussions by the courts in many of
the cases do not indicate clearly the theory under which relief is
sought, it appears that disparagement of the mineral quality of
plaintiff's land is a factor in the reasoning of at least some
decisions. 9
The problems associated with disparagement of quality as a
ground for relief in unauthorized geophysical exploration cases are
thoroughly discussed by W. L. Summers, a noted oil and gas au-
thority.6 0 Summers points out that in an action for disparagement
of the mineral quality of land arising from unauthorized geophysi-
cal testing, the plaintiff must prove the following elements in order
to recover: (1) the plaintiff owns the land or has some transferable
mineral interest in it; (2) the defendant published or communi-
cated to some person, other than the plaintiff, a statement dispar-
aging the mineral quality of the land; (3) the statement is not true,
in fact; and (4) actual damage was caused to the plaintiff by the
statement. 1
The two primary obstacles to recovery are the requirement of
communication of a disparaging statement and the requirement
that the statement be false. Most frequently - especially with re-
46. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1957); Iberville Land
Co. v. Amerada Petroleum Co., 141 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1944).
47. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 94, at 630 (4th ed. 1971).
48. Id. See also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586, 591-92 (5th Cir.
1957)(limiting damages to land actually "occupied").
49. See Angelloz v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 196 La. 604, 199 So. 656 (1940)(plaintiff
awarded $7500 for "disparagement of mineral quality"); Martel v. Hall Oil Co., 36 Wyo. 166,
253 P. 802 (1927)(a dry hole case where recovery was denied).
50. Summers, supra note 35 at § 660.
51. Id.
[Vol. 44
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cent technology - the information communicated about the prop-
erty is true, thus barring relief under the disparagement of quality
theory. Nevertheless, the injury to the plaintiff caused by wrongful
appropriation of the exploration right may be very real, particu-
larly when the speculative value of the land has been ruined or
seriously questioned.
E. Invasion of Privacy
The wrong committed by unauthorized geophysical explora-
tions has been compared by one commentator to an invasion of
privacy.52 There are certainly elements of this tort in most factual
situations involving geophysical "trespass." The nature of the tort,
however, has stamped the claim for relief with certain require-
ments that make it inappropriate in this situation." As in dispar-
agement of mineral quality, public disclosure is required but is not
always present in unauthorized exploration situations. In addition,
most jurisdictions, including Montana, require an element of out-
raged personal feelings caused by the invasion. 4 In Sistok v.
Northwestern Telephone Systems,5 5 a telephone tapping case, the
Montana Supreme Court defined the cause of action as a "wrong-
ful intrusion into one's private activities in such a manner as to
outrage or cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a per-
son of ordinary sensibilities." ' This does not describe the typical
unauthorized geophysical exploration situation, though to what
different contexts "private activities" and "outrage" might apply is
uncertain.
F. Trade Secrets
One commentator has suggested that wrongful appropriation
of the right to explore for minerals is analogous to the law of trade
secrets.57 Examination of trade secret principles is indeed instruc-
tive because they have developed, not from one coherent legal the-
ory, but from a variety of elements pragmatically taken from con-
tract law, property law, equity, and other areas of law. 8
52. Malone, Ruminations on a New Tort, 4 LA. L. REv. 309 (1942).
53. See Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Melvin v. Reid,
112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931); Ford Motor Co. v. Williams, 108 Ga. App. 21, 132
S.E.2d 206 (1963).
54. Sistok v. Northwestern Telephone Systems, - Mont. -, 615 P.2d 176 (1980).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 182.
57. Note, Oil and Gas: Improper Geophysical Exploration, 32 OLA. L. REV. 903
(1979).
58. A. TURNER, TRADE SECRETS 3 (1962).
1983]
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Technically, however, the property right involved in mineral explo-
ration does not meet the definitional requirements of a trade secret
as developed by the courts.6 9 The commentator concedes this tech-
nical deficiency but suggests that courts in wrongful geophysical
activity cases should use the two-step approach employed in trade
secret cases to determine whether a plaintiff is entitled to relief:
first, determine whether the plaintiff has a legally protectable in-
terest in the information or process; and second, decide whether
the defendant used improper means in acquiring it.6 0 It is the sec-
ond step, the good faith or ethical conduct of the defendant, which
should play the determining role, according to the commentator. 61
Such an approach would prohibit recovery in situations where
the exploration right has been wrongfully appropriated through
negligence rather than bad faith or unethical conduct on the part
of the operator. Cases alleging wrongful geophysical activity, how-
ever, contain more examples of boundary errors than of bad faith.
Yet when the defendant, without authority, gains valuable infor-
mation through negligence or mistake, the mineral owner suffers as
much of a loss as when the information results from unethical con-
duct. Thus, the morality of defendant's conduct should not neces-
sarily be a factor in the recovery by plaintiff of compensatory dam-
ages. It would, however, be an important factor in determining
whether punitive damages are recoverable.
The conclusion that must be reached from analysis of the case
law is that none of the traditional legal theories fit the factual situ-
ation presented by unauthorized geophysical operations; and such
traditional theories are becoming increasingly inappropriate with
every new development in the technology of exploration. Nonethe-
less, the courts have allowed recovery under a variety of fact pat-
terns. Whether the courts speak in terms of trespass, quasi-con-
tract, or some other legal theory, where recovery has been allowed,
the damages awarded are similar and indicate that the decisions
are based upon a broader principle which is entitled to separate
recognition. The courts, in effect, have implicitly recognized a new
tort which, for purposes of discussion, may be termed the wrongful
appropriation of the right to explore. The kinds of damages
awarded by the courts help to further define this tort.
59. Note, supra note 57.
60. Id. at 910.
61. Id.
[Vol. 44
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V. DAMAGES
Courts have awarded three types of damages in unauthorized
geophysical exploration cases: actual surface damage, the value of
the exploration right taken, and loss of lease value. Punitive dam-
ages may also be awarded in the appropriate factual situation.
A. Actual Damage
Actual surface damage has been the type of damage most
readily accepted by the courts, probably because damage to trees,
fences, and other surface features is easily proved and measured;
this is the type of damage most often associated with trespass
cases. Where no actual damages are shown, courts have been will-
ing to grant nominal damages. Where the minerals have been sev-
ered from the surface, the mineral owner, of course, receives no
benefit from these damages.
In Thomas v. Texas Co., 2 even though the plaintiff sought to
recover for the alleged destruction of market value of his land, the
Texas court awarded only nominal damages on the grounds that
the evidence failed to establish that the trespass was the proximate
cause of the alleged loss of value. Similarly in the earliest Louisi-
ana opinion involving wrongful geophysical operation, Le Bleu v.
Vacuum Oil Co.,6" plaintiff's recovery was limited to a $100 nomi-
nal award for trespass, instead of the damages sought for lease de-
preciation. Apparently, limitation of damages in these cases to ac-
tual surface damage, or nominal damages, is a direct result of
basing the theory of the case on trespass and of failure by the
courts to recognize that the more serious wrong committed against
plaintiff was not the physical trespass, but rather, the wrongful ap-
propriation of the exploration right.
In Montana the question of recovery for surface damage has
been resolved by statute. 4 Compensation is allowed in an amount
equal to the damages sustained by the surface owner for loss of
agricultural production and income, lost land value, and lost value
of improvements caused by oil and gas operations (defined as ex-
ploration or drilling). This remedy would seem to apply regardless
of whether the damage was caused by authorized or unauthorized
exploration activities. The statute protects the surface owner and
provides no direct relief to the mineral owner.
62. 12 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
63. 15 La. App. 689, 132 So. 233 (1931).
64. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 82-10-501 to -511 (1981).
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B. Value of Exploration Right
Actual surface damage is usually an insignificant part of the
loss sustained by plaintiffs due to wrongful appropriation of the
right to explore. Once the courts determined that the right to ex-
plore for minerals should be protected, a measure of damages had
to be found that would compensate the mineral owner for the
wrong committed.
The Fifth Circuit recognized such a measure in Shell Petro-
leum v. Scully. 5 Scully owned a large parcel of swamp land in
Louisiana for which defendant Shell had unsuccessfully attempted
to negotiate exploration rights. While conducting seismic tests on
neighboring land, Shell detonated explosive charges at two shot
points located on Scully's land. The survey yielded favorable infor-
mation and Shell then offered to lease Scully's land. Scully refused
and sued Shell to recover the value of the right to explore the land.
Shell argued that because there was no diminution of the lease
value of Scully's land, Scully was entitled only to nominal dam-
ages. The court disagreed:
We do not agree with defendant that there should have been an
instruction for nominal damages only .... It is a fundamental
and cardinal principle of the law of damages that the injured
party shall have compensation for the injury sustained. The in-
jured party is entitled to recover full indemnity for his loss, and
to be placed as nearly as may be in the condition which he would
have occupied had he not suffered the injury complained of. No
measure of damages which does not afford just compensation for
the loss sustained can stand the fundamental test." s
Thus, the court sent the case back for a jury determination of the
amount of damages which would compensate plaintiff for the
wrongful appropriation of his right to explore.
There is no question that the right of exploration for minerals
has a real value over and above the value of the minerals them-
selves. The real value of the exploration right is evidenced by oil
companies that are sometimes willing to pay large sums of money
for the privilege. The value, of course, varies from area to area but
normally can be determined by reference to the prices paid for
other tracts in the same area. The value of the exploration right as
a recoverable element of damages has been recognized by most
cases dealing with unauthorized geophysical operations . 7
65. 71 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1934).
66. Id. at 775.
67. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1957); Franklin v.
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C. Loss of Lease Value
Although frequently claimed as damages, courts have been
more reluctant to recognize loss of lease value as a measure of
damages. In the typical factual situation, plaintiff alleges that the
wrongful geophysical survey produced negative information which
was communicated to the public or to other oil companies. The
result is that the mineral owner, who had been offered a certain
amount to lease his land before the survey, is now unable to lease
for that price or, in some cases, for any price.
The first case to recognize and award damages for loss of lease
value involved not unauthorized geophysical activity but the actual
drilling of a dry hole. In Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Kishi, 8
Humble entered Kishi's property over his protest, but in good
faith, believing its lease was still valid. Because of a producing well
located on adjacent property, the lease value of Kishi's land at the
time of entry was $1000 per acre. Following the drilling of the dry
hole by Humble, the lease value was virtually nil. The Texas court
reversed the lower court's award of merely nominal damages and
awarded the "before" lease value of the property, stating that
"proof of the market value was in law sufficient to determine the
amount of the judgment." 9
The Kishi case was severely criticized by one commentator 70
and was also attacked two years later by the Wyoming Supreme
Court in Martel v. Hall Oil Co.7 1 There, under similar facts, the
Wyoming court denied all but nominal recovery to the plaintiff,
stating that "whatever value the rights of plaintiff had were purely
speculative, ' 7 2 and speculative damages are not recoverable. The
Martel court argued that because there was no oil on the property,
the property never had any value for lease purposes. Even if plain-
tiff could have sold a lease, the court asked, "what would they have
given in return? Nothing. They would have sold something of no
value whatever. '73
The court's reasoning is erroneous. The fact that there is no
Arkansas Fuel Co., 218 La. 987, 51 So.2d 600 (1951); Layne La. Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 209
La. 1014, 26 So.2d 20 (1946); Angelloz v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 196 La. 604, 199 So. 656
(1940). Cf. Gulf Coast Real Estate Auction Co. v. Chevron Indus., Inc., 665 F.2d 514 (5th
Cir. 1982)(evidentiary problems in assigning independent value to exploration right).
68. 276 S.W. 190 (Tex. 1925).
69. Id. at 191.
70. See Note, What Protection Has a Landowner Against a Trespass Which Merely
Destroys the Speculative Value of His Property? 4 TEx. L. REv. 215 (1925-26).
71. 36 Wyo. 166, 253 P. 862 (1927).
72. Id. at 179, 253 P. at 864.
73. Id. at 183, 253 P. at 866.
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oil under a parcel of land does not mean there is not a real value
for lease purposes. The court confused "speculative value"-in the
sense of not being reasonably certain and ascertainable-with
value for speculative purposes. Certainly the purpose of leasing the
land would be to speculate on the possibility of finding oil. This
does not mean that there is not a relatively certain and ascertaina-
ble value to such a lease.
The unfortunate effect of the Martel case was to contribute
the term "loss of speculative value" to the legal vocabulary. Use of
the term in commentaries on unauthorized geophysical operations
contributes to perpetuation of the same confusion exhibited by the
Martel court.7 ' The Martel decision has not been followed by other
courts, and loss of lease value, if established by sufficient evidence,
can be recovered at least in cases of dry hole trespass."
When the claimed loss of lease value has been caused by unau-
thorized geophysical operations, the courts are divided as to recov-
ery of this measure of damages.7 6 A close reading of the cases, how-
ever, indicates that at least where a specific sale is lost due to the
unauthorized geophysical operations, recovery has been allowed.
Broken down into its components, loss of lease value has at
least three different elements: (1) loss of a potential bonus usually
paid for the execution of a lease; (2) loss of annual rental; and (3)
loss of royalty. The first two elements appear to have value regard-
less of the actual presence of oil or gas (although a lessee may al-
low the lease, and thus the obligation to pay rent, to lapse follow-
ing the discovery of oil or gas or the drilling of a dry hole). Since
royalty, however, depends on production, it would be difficult to
establish a value in the absence of oil or gas. Nonetheless, if the
plaintiff can show loss of a specific opportunity to sell the royalty
interest, it seems appropriate to allow this element as well. In
Thomas v. Texas Co.,7 plaintiff made just such a claim. The court
disallowed the claim, however, partly on the basis that there was
no proof of loss of an actual sale.
Recovery of lost lease value as a measure of damages for
74. See, e.g., I. WnLLIAuS & C. MEYERS, OiL & GAS LAW § 229 (1978).
75. Holcombe v. Superior Oil Co., 213 La. 684, 35 So.2d 451 (1948); Layne La. Co. v.
Superior Oil Co., 209 La. 1014, 26 So.2d 20 (1946); Angelloz v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 196
La. 604, 199 So. 656 (1940); American Surety v. Marsh, 146 Okla. 261, 293 P. 1041 (1930).
76. Layne La. Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 209 La. 1014, 26 So.2d 20 (1946)(allowing recov-
ery); Angelloz v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 196 La. 604, 199 So. 656 (1940)(allowing recovery);
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1951)(plaintiffs unable to establish
decrease in market value); Shell Petroleum v. Scully, 71 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1934)(plaintiff
not entitled to recover lost lease value in absence of claim in pleadings).
77. 12 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
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wrongful appropriation of the exploration right should be distin-
guished from the tort of interference with the right to lease, a tort
which has long been recognized and for which lost lease value is
also a measure of damages. American Surety Co. v. Marsh7 8 in-
volved such interference with the right to lease. Under an invalid
lease, defendant possessed land which was actually leased to the
plaintiff. The issue was litigated, and during an appeal from a
judgment against the defendant in the lower court, defendant pro-
ceeded to drill on adjacent land which resulted in a dry hole. After
the judgment was affirmed, plaintiff sued for loss of lease value,
proving that he lost a specific opportunity to sell his lease due to
defendant's wrongful possession of the land while drilling the dry
hole during the appeal. The court, relying on Kishi, awarded the
difference in the "before" and "after" lease values.7 9
Because of the absence of trespass, it appears that the wrong
actually recognized by the court, and for which relief was granted,
was interference by defendant with plaintiff's right to lease. If the
wrongful activity conducted during the pendency of the appeal had
been a geophysical survey conducted on adjacent land, which had
led to the same result, the court's holding should have been the
same. Again, the wrongful activity in that situation would not be
the exploration per se, but interference with the plaintiff's right to
lease his land while the exploration occurred.
The Montana Supreme Court recognized the tort of interfer-
ence with the right to lease in Solberg v. Sunburst Oil & Gas Co.80
In that case defendant negligently failed to publish a declaration
clearing an expired oil and gas lease from the record. The court
affirmed an award of damages to plaintiff based upon a lost oppor-
tunity to lease the property clouded by defendant. In its discus-
sion, the court distinguished the action from slander of title and
declared that the proper measure of damages was "the difference
between what plaintiff could and would have sold for, or, in other
words, the fair market value of such a lease, at a time when the
record should have been clear, and the market value of such a lease
at the time of trial."81
D. Punitive Damages
As with any other tort, punitive damages should be recover-
able in wrongful geophysical exploration cases on an appropriate
78. 146 Okla. 261, 293 P. 1041 (1930).
79. Id. at 266-67, 293 P. at 1047.
80. 76 Mont. 254, 246 P. 168 (1926).
81. Id. at 274-75, 246 P. at 177.
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showing of facts. The Montana Supreme Court in Francis v. Sun
Oil Co.8 stated that the willful act of defendant in going ahead
with its seismic operations, after being warned that it was getting
too close to the spring, was sufficient evidence of legal malice to
make the question of punitive damages one for the jury.83
VI. CONCLUSION
Returning to the three hypothetical situations posed at the be-
ginning of the article, it is evident that the right of exploration has
been wrongfully appropriated in situations one and two, but not in
three. Because the first hypothetical also involves a physical tres-
pass, most courts would allow recovery of surface damages and the
value of the exploration right. Recovery of loss of value for leasing
purposes may be allowed where plaintiff can show loss of a specific
opportunity to lease.
Although the exploration right has also been wrongfully ap-
propriated in the second situation, it is more doubtful whether,
under the current state of the law, recovery would be allowed. Yet
the injury to the mineral owner is no less than in the first situa-
tion. No court has allowed recovery in the third situation, nor
should there be recovery, since the owner's right to explore or lease
his own property has not been directly affected.
As in other areas of technology, recent technological advances
in geophysical exploration have created difficulties for the law.
Wrongful appropriation of the right to explore for minerals is no
longer necessarily associated with physical trespass. In order to
keep pace, courts must be willing to look beyond traditional legal
theories which no longer provide an adequate framework within
which to protect the mineral owner.
82. 135 Mont. 307, 340 P.2d 824 (1959).
83. Id. at 310, 340 P.2d at 826.
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